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Determinants of Further Training: Evidence for Germany 
 
Based on a German representative sample of employees we explore the relevance and 
development of further training in private sector firms. We focus on formal training and 
explore possible individual and job-based determinants of its incidence. We also show 
changes over time during a 20 year observation period from 1989 to 2008. Most hypotheses 
are supported by the empirical evidence. Job status and firm size are the most relevant 
characteristics for training participation. Furthermore, our analyses reveal a general trend of 
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 1. Introduction 
Due to the increasing worldwide competition among firms it is necessary especially for 
firms in economically developed countries to have productive employees. In addition, 
occupational relevant knowledge (human capital) is important from an individual 
perspective in order to enhance present and future employability. General knowledge 
acquired in school or university may not be sufficient for most employment 
relationships, but has to be complemented by additional knowledge and abilities for the 
specific job. Besides, knowledge previously learnt may obsolesce especially in dynamic 
markets with a lot of product and procedural innovations so that the use of further (or 
continuous) training
1 in firms may be reasonable in order to refresh and adjust 
employees’ human capital. Combined with the problem of aging workforces, further 
training seems to be a necessity for both employees and firms to survive in the market. 
Therefore, many firms actually offer some kind of informal or formal further training to 
their employees. 
As competition has increased during ongoing globalization, we may expect to observe 
growing participation in training over the last decades. In this contribution, we focus on 
the German case. Here, the employer association and trade unions agree that further 
training is a key to competitiveness and employability (Confederation of German 
Employers 2007, Confederation of German Trade Unions 2009). This is in line with the 
European Commission stating that “skills matter. (…) They are the best insurance 
against unemployment (…) [and] are a major component of the [European] Union´s 
productivity, competitiveness and innovation” (European Communities 2009, p. 2). 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we use the terms “further training”, “continuous training”, “vocational training”, 
“occupational training” and simply “training” in a widely synonymous way. However, further training is most probably not equally reasonable for all groups of 
employees and firms. One can interpret further training as a form of investment, 
because there are also costs that emerge in terms of direct costs for the training course 
or opportunity costs of time when visiting this course. These costs have to be amortized 
by possible benefits afterwards. We expect that there are significant differences about 
the amount of these benefits between different groups of employees. This should result 
in different rates of training participation for different groups. Hence, the aim of this 
study is to empirically analyze possible individual and job-based determinants that 
affect the decision if a worker receives further training. We do not address 
consequences of further training, see instead Pannenberg (2001), Büchel and 
Pannenberg (2004) or Wolter and Schiener (2009) for the impact on wages, Georgellis 
and Lange (2007) for the impact on job satisfaction or Zwick (2005) for the impact on 
establishment productivity in Germany. 
This is not the first paper on this issue. Previous contributions for the German case 
include some cross-section studies for single years of the German Mikrozensus, which 
is part of the Labour Force Survey of the European Union.
2 Hubert and Wolf (2007) and 
Leber and Möller (2008) calculated yearly training rates of employees of 0.15 in 2003 
respectively 2004 and show that training rates are higher for better educated an in large 
firms, for instance. Some other previous studies use data of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). Most of these studies are also restricted to a cross-section 
analysis (Behringer 1999, Pischke 2001, Büchel and Pannenberg 2004). To the best of 
our knowledge, there are only two papers that use data of more than one year. However, 
none of these makes use of panel estimations. Pannenberg (1998) analyzes the relevance 
of training for West Germans during the time span 1986 to 1993 based on the GSOEP 
                                                 
2 Besides, there is some purely descriptive evidence arguments for a substitution effect against (see 
Bellmann (2003) for an overview). waves of 1989 and 1993 and finds that 0.38 of employees participated in formal training 
at least once in this time span. Participation rates were higher for male, better educated 
and in large firms. The paper probably closest to our contribution is a study by 
Georgellis and Lange (2007), although they rather focus on effects of further training 
with respect to job satisfaction. They extend the analysis the GSOEP wave of the year 
2000 and observe training participation rates of 0.28 in three year periods for West 
Germans.  
In this contribution we extend the analysis to the year 2008 so that for the first time 
developments over two whole decades can be observed. In contrast to prior studies we 
apply panel estimations. We also include East Germans after re-unification so that we 
can explore the transformation process with respect to formal training. In addition, we 
exclude employees from the public sector. We think that participation rates are more 
intuitive on a yearly base, while previous studies use rates in a three year period by the 
majority. We derive hypotheses for several individual and job-based characteristics of 
participation in formal training.  
We will go on by deriving our hypotheses for individual and job based characteristics of 
further training (section 2). We mainly focus on human capital theory. The data and 
variables are presented in section 3 followed by the outline of our results in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations and hypotheses  
Since further training is usually not for free – as mentioned above –, it can be 
characterized as an investment. These investments in human capital have to be paid by 
the employees and/or firms. Trainings can be distinguished with respect to several attributes: The outcome of training may rather have the character of general or firm-
specific human capital. The initiative and the funding of the training may be assigned 
either to the firm or to the employee. The training may either be given in a formal 
program or informal (on-the-job) training. And one can also distinguish between 
internal and external programs. 
We focus on formal training programs for employees in our empirical investigation so 
that we have this kind of further training in mind, when deriving hypotheses of possible 
determinants. In the following two sub-sections we will argue that the provision of 
further training may differ across subgroups of employees and jobs. 
 
2.1 Individual characteristics  
We first consider possible individual characteristics of participation in further training. 
Employees’ age may be relevant due to several reasons. A main result of human capital 
theory is that investments are sensible rather for young employees because of a larger 
scope for amortization (Becker 1962). Therefore, we usually should not observe further 
training for the elderly. On the other hand, there may no need for formal trainings for 
young employees who just completed their apprenticeship or graduated from university, 
when age acts as a proxy for labor market experience. Therefore, medium aged 
employees may have higher training probabilities than younger ones, because they have 
to update occupational knowledge and skills. We conclude: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Age): 
Participation in further training is inversely u-shaped in age. 
 Direct discrimination is forbidden in European labor markets. However, Erlinghagen 
(2005) states that women have shorter periods of realized tenure in Germany. Hence, 
some kind of statistical discrimination may still be relevant if firms anticipate shorter 
expected tenure periods of female employees. If this is true, we can argue that 
employers are less willing to provide formal training programs for women, because of a 
lower probability that investments amortize. If employees have to bear the training 
costs, the same argument holds. Women rather will forbear from investments in further 
training. This leads to  
 
Hypothesis 2 (Sex): 
Women have lower probabilities of training participation than men. 
 
The case of foreign employees is supposed to be similar to that of women. Differences 
for foreigners compared to natives with respect to wages and promotions are widely 
discussed in the literature (see e. g. Constant and Massey (2005)). Therefore, there 
should also be evidence for an unequal treatment by the employers with respect to 
decisions on training participation. Second, employers may expect that average tenure is 
shorter for foreign employees because they do not have social and/or cultural roots in 
Germany and that they return to their home country after some years. Then, the training 
rate should be lower for foreign people. Finally, participation in courses taught in 
German may sometimes be hindered by language problems of foreigners. We therefore 
state: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Foreigners): 
Foreigners are less involved in further training.  
 The relation between employees’ schooling and participation in further training is less 
straightforward. On the one hand it can be easier for more capable persons to benefit 
from both general education and further training. In this context, further training may be 
a complement to previous human capital investments such as schooling. Better educated 
employees are more efficient in learning so that further training is rather beneficial for 
them (Mincer 1992, p. 18). The latter argument is enhanced, if certain schooling degrees 
act as trustworthy signals for motivation in the sense of Spence (1973) with respect to 
educational investments.  
On the other hand further training may also act as a substitute to schooling. Employees 
without certain knowledge from school such as foreign languages may catch up things 
in formal training programs. Decreasing marginal benefits may be another argument for 
firms rather to provide further training for less educated employees. We therefore 




Hypothesis 4 (Schooling): 
a)  Better educated employees get more further training. 
b)  Better educated employees get less further training. 
 
2.2 Job- and firm-based characteristics  
First, tenure is supposed to be a relevant characteristic. Employees may face formal 
internal trainings directly after recruitment in order to learn firm-specific tools and 
processes or to get involved into the specific corporate culture. After these initial 
courses the probability of training should then diminish. Further training can become 
                                                 
3 We cannot test these two each other empirically due to lack of appropriate data. relevant again for those employees with higher tenure to be updated on procedural or 
product innovations in the firm. This leads to our  
 
Hypothesis 5 (Tenure): 
Participation in further training is u-shaped in tenure. 
 
This argument is quite different compared to what we argued above with respect to age: 
Here, we focus on new intra-firm tools and processes that require further training and 
not on innovations in the occupational environment concentrating on the individual age 
(as a proxy for labor market experience). For example, an accountant has to learn new 
legal rules (occupational environment) and also has to familiarize himself with the new 
company IT system (intra-firm environment). 
The contracts for some employees are limited to a certain period of time. Limited work 
contracts can have several functions: For example, they can be used to enhance 
workforce flexibility since firms do not face any direct separation costs like severance 
payments when terminating limited contracts. Furthermore, they may act as a solution 
for the adverse-selection problem resulting from asymmetric information in the labor 
market (Akerlof 1970), as they are similar to a probation time whilst the employer can 
observe the abilities of the employee. Even if there is the possibility that the contract 
becomes renewed, the expected duration of the employment relationship is shorter in a 
situation with a limited contract, compared to one with an unlimited contract. In 
consequence, an amortization is less likely. This leads to 
 
Hypothesis 6 (Limited work contract): 
The probability of being trained is lower for people with a limited work 
contract. Additionally, further training shall be more relevant for certain jobs. Employees with 
responsible jobs and comprehensive tasks face a variety of necessary skills. The larger 
the complexity of necessary skills is, the higher is the probability that some skills or 
knowledge has to be accumulated by formal trainings. For instance, a simple member of 
a work team, who becomes promoted to the position of team leader, has to acquire 
certain skills of managing a team. These skills may include handling intra-team 
conflicts in an effective way or setting the right incentives to work, for instance. It is 
likely that these competences are taught in formal courses. Another possible explanation 
is the following: Ceteris paribus firms promote employees which are more productive 
than others. Hence, a higher hierarchical level could stand for a higher individual 
productivity of the employee. This productivity could depend on individual 
characteristics like schooling or age, but also on the individual motivation of the 
employee (that cannot be directly observed in our data). If this is true, we can assume 
that employees on higher levels are on average higher motivated and more productive. 
From the firm perspective it is better to provide training courses to relatively motivated 
employees because of the expected better amortization of investments. We therefore 
state: 
 
Hypothesis 7 (Job status): 
Participation in further training increases in the level of job 
responsibility. 
Formal training is supposed to be more relevant in large firms due to several reasons. 
First, the fix costs of training arrangements can be distributed on more employees, 
which lead to economies of scale (Haber 1991). Second, it is likely that larger firms 
have better opportunities to re-allocate tasks, if certain employees are absent due to training participation (Pannenberg 1995, p. 54). Third, larger firms are more likely to 
implement internal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971), which lead to longer 
expected tenure periods and less risky training investments (Holtmann and Idson 1991). 
 
Hypothesis 8 (Firm size): 
Employees of large firms get more further training than those of small 
firms. 
 
The expected benefit of formal training arrangements may also increase in the weekly 
working time of the employee. The firm benefits especially from the increased 
individual productivity, if the trained employee works many hours (Behringer 1999, p. 
39). This leads to: 
 
Hypothesis 9 (Working time): 
Participation in further training increases with actual working hours. 
 
2.3 Historical and contemporary background 
Competition among firms increased over the last decades due to ongoing globalization. 
If (minimum) wages are fixed by collective agreements or guaranteed benefits of the 
welfare state in case of unemployment like in Germany and worldwide competition 
becomes harder, firms are forced to maintain or increase employees’ productivity. 
Further training might be an appropriate opportunity. This leads to  
 
Hypothesis 10 (Time): 
Participation in further training increased over time.  
 The German case is most likely be influenced by re-unification in 1990. The 
transformation process in East Germany at the beginning of the 1990s led to a 
necessary adaption to the market economy. Therefore, employees had to learn 
corresponding knowledge and skills on short notice so that our last conjecture is 
 
Hypothesis 11 (Region): 
East German employees face extraordinary high rates of further training 
directly after re-unification. 
 
Table 1 shows a short summary of our hypotheses. We now go on by describing our 
data set and the methodology for analyzing the participation in further training in 
Germany. 
Table 1: Summary of hypotheses 
 
Individual characteristics: 
Age       inversely  u-shaped 
F e m a l e        ( – )  
Foreigner      (–) 
Years of schooling        (+) vs. (-) 
 
 
Job- and firm-based characteristics: 
Tenure       u-shaped 
Limited  work  contract     (–) 
Job status (Level of job responsibility)    (+) 
Firm  size      (+) 
Working  time      (+) 
 
 
Historical and contemporary background 
Year  of  observation     (+) 
East  Germany      (+)  (especially  in  1993) 
 3. Data, Variables and Methodology  
We make use of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which is a representative 
data set of people living in Germany. Individuals are asked on a yearly base about 
several areas of life including general attitudes and their employment relationship next 
to usual demographics. Detailed questions on further training are asked in the years 
1989, 1993, 2000, 2004 and 2008. We restrict our sample to full- and part-time 
employees with a minimum and maximum age of 20 and 65 (the regular retirement age) 
respectively. We also exclude civil servants and employees from the public sector from 
our analysis as we want to explore further training in the private sector. The data set 
consists of 18,375 observations from 10,363 different persons. We, therefore, have an 
unbalanced panel (1989: n=2,502; 1993: n=3,693; 2000: n=3,332; 2004: n=4,492, 2008: 
n=4,356). Differences in sample sizes across years can be explained by the integration 
of East Germans from the year 1991 onwards, some panel refreshments and general 
panel mortality. 
In Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics about our data set. We distinguish between 
years in order to show some developments over time. Foreign people are somewhat 
over-represented in the first years of our sample (in 1989 (2008): 0.324 (0.063) 
compared to 0.077 (0.069) of the whole workforce in Germany, see German Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2009, table 2.7). Therefore, we make use of the 
GSOEP weighting variables as suggested by Frick, Haisken-DeNew, Spiess, and 
Wagner (2005) so that our data set is continuously representative for the German 
workforce. Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
   1989 1993 2000 2004 2008  Total 
     
Participation in further training  0.165 0.181 0.201 0.198 0.235  0.197 
     
Age   Mean  38.6 39.6 40.8 41.3 41.6 40.4 
  Stand.  deviation  11.2 10.3 10.1 10.4 10.5  10.3 
     
Female  0.342 0.352 0.36 0.391 0.401  0.370 
     
Foreigner  0.092 0.104 0.087 0.074 0.076  0.087 
     
Residence in East Germany  0,000 0.170 0.176 0.169 0.177  0.145 
     
Years of schooling     
0-10.5 years  0.548 0.498 0.407 0.370 0.339  0.430 
11-14.5 years  0.359 0.405 0.460 0.487 0.504  0.445 
15-18 years  0.093 0.097 0.133 0.143 0.158  0.125 
     
  Mean  11.2 11.4 11.8 11.9 12.1  11.7 
  Stand.  deviation  2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4  2.3 
     
Job status     
Untrained blue-collar worker  0.040 0.037 0.023 0.023 0.042  0.033 
Semi-trained blue-collar worker  0.163 0.145 0.140 0.144 0.135  0.145 
Trained blue-collar worker  0.228 0.241 0.206 0.207 0.196  0.216 
Foreman, team leader  0.065 0.074 0.064 0.056 0.056  0.063 
White-collar worker with simple tasks  0.096 0.118 0.119 0.129 0.136  0.121 
Qualified professional  0.273 0.230 0.259 0.274 0.261  0.258 
Highly qual. prof. or man. position  0.135 0.155 0.189 0.166 0.175  0.165 
     
Tenure     
Tenure   Mean  10.5 10.3 10.1 10.4 10.5  10.3 
  Stand.  deviation  9.5 9.5 9.6 9.5 9.3  9.3 
     
Limited work contract  0.034 0.020 0.049 0.045 0.029  0.035 
     
Weekly working time     
≤ 30 hours (part-time)  0.134 0.109 0.129 0.151 0.151  0.134 
> 30 hours (full-time)  0.866 0.891 0.871 0.849 0.849  0.866 
     
Firm size     
Up to 19 employees  0.228 0.231 0.261 0.260 0.254  0.247 
20-199 employees  0.296 0.292 0.312 0.328 0.314  0.308 
200-1999 employees  0.239 0.252 0.215 0.211 0.217  0.227 
At least 2000 employees  0.237 0.225 0.212 0.202 0.216  0.218 
     
Industry     
Agriculture  0.014 0.029 0.025 0.017 0.014  0.020 
Manufacturing  0.550 0.490 0.430 0.405 0.407  0.454 
Construction  0.103 0.119 0.083 0.079 0.070  0.091 
Retail/Tourism/Transportation  0.164 0.215 0.237 0.247 0.233  0.221 
Financial/Corporate Services  0.102 0.084 0.106 0.124 0.145  0.112 
Public and Private Services  0.067 0.063 0.120 0.127 0.131  0.102 
     
Observations  2,502 3,693 3,332 4,491 4,356 18,375 
    
Note: The results are calculated with cross-sectional weights. Apparently, employees become older over the observed period. Besides, the fraction of 
women and the average amount of years of schooling increase. The structural change 
from the secondary to the tertiary sector is captured by the decreasing fraction of blue-
collar workers in the sample. The average tenure decreases from 10.5 years in 1989 
down to 10.1 years in 2000, but increases again up to 10.5 years in 2008. 
Correspondingly, the fraction of employees with a temporally limited work contract 
rises from 0.034 in 1989 up to 0.049 in 2000 and falls again to 0.029 in 2008. The 
distribution with respect to firm size shows off a smooth shift to smaller firms.  
Individuals are asked in the GSOEP to give some detailed information about 
participation in formal training, for example about the date and duration of the course. 
Combined with the information about the date of the interview, we are able to compute 
a binary variable “participated in further training” with “1=yes” if the employee has 
attended at least one course in the 12 month prior to the interview and “0=no” if not. 
This variable acts as the dependent variable of our multivariate analysis. This approach 
allows us to directly speak of “yearly further training rates” of subgroups.  
Some previous studies (Pannenberg 1995, Behringer 1999, Pischke 2001, Büchel and 
Pannenberg 2004, Georgellis and Lange 2007) have used an alternative approach. In 
GSOEP, respondents are also asked: “How many courses for further professional 
education have you attended in the last three years?” In these studies, employees denote 
a training participation if they state a number higher than zero with respect to this 
question. In our opinion, employees should be better able to review the one year period 
and we hope to get more valid results. Another advantage of this approach is that we 
can compute yearly training rates for different subgroups and compare them over time. To test our hypotheses we make use of several variables of the GSOEP. Since we want 
to find out the characteristics that account for participating in training in year t, we use 
the information of the individual and job-based characteristics of year t-1 (which is 
possible due to the panel structure of the GSOEP). Thus, we make sure to use the 
information from before the training measurement, since we observe only courses in the 
one year period.  
We have information for individuals’ age, sex, schooling and the observation year. We 
also distinguish between German and foreign employees. With respect to our 
considerations on job- and firm-based characteristics, we are aware of the individual 
tenure (in years), job status (seven categories of blue-collar and white-collar jobs 
differing in the responsibility of tasks), actual working time (hours per week) and the 
temporally limitation of the work contract (dummy). Firm size is measured with the 
number of employees of the firm in which the respondent works (four categories). We 
also control for industries (six categories). Analyzing the historical and contemporary 
background, we take year dummies into consideration and have also information on the 
region people live in (East Germany vs. West Germany).  
We will start with some descriptive statistics by comparing further training rates 
between different subgroups and between the observed years. Furthermore, we also 
apply a binary probit approach with the dummy “Further training” as the dependent 
variable (1=”yes”, 0=”no”). The arguments in section 2 suggest that several individual 
(x) and job-based (y) characteristics and the contemporary background (z) may affect 
the participation in further training so that 
Further Training = α + x'β + y'δ + z'χ + ε describes our empirical model. The effect of the independent variables on the 
probability of participation in further training is indicated by the corresponding 
regression coefficients β, δ, and χ, whereas α represents the intercept. 
We start by analyzing the pooled data set including all observations from 1989 until 
2008. Therefore, we make use of a random effects binary probit model for several 
reasons. First, we want to analyze the impact of time-invariant determinants like sex or 
nationality. This would not be possible by using a fixed effects model. Second, our data 
set has an unbalanced structure with many employees with observations in only one 
year. These observations would not be taken into account in a fixed effects model 
(Wooldrige 2002, p. 580). Finally, for those persons with information in multiple years 
and variation in the dependent variable (about 2,500 persons), the result of the Hausman 
test is not significant, which indicates that a random effects model is more efficient 
compared to a fixed effects model. Subsequently, we investigate the single years´ data 
by applying cross section binary probit models. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate a first impression of yearly training rates of employees. There 
is an upward trend in the incidence of formal training (Figure 1a). Whereas 0.165 of 
employees have been trained in 1989, the fraction has increased to 0.235 in 2008. As 
one can see from Figure 1b, foreigners have considerable lower rates of training than 
German employees in all five years. Training rates directly after the German re-
unification in 1990 are somewhat higher in East Germany, which is in line with our 
prediction. In the subsequent years, East and West German employees have a nearly 
identical probability of being trained (Figure 1c). Figure 1: Participation rates in further training over time (individual 
characteristics and historical background) 
Note: The results are calculated with cross-sectional weights. Figure 1d illustrates the predicted inversely u-shaped relation between age and training 
participation for certain years, which is in accordance with our conjecture. Training 
rates do not differ considerably between male and female employees. In contrast, 
employees face different training rates with respect to education. Rates for individuals 
with at least 15 years of schooling (university graduates) are about 16 percentage points 
higher as for employees with 11.5 up to 14.5 years and even on average 30 percentage 
points higher as for individuals with at most 11 years of schooling. 
Participation rates in further training with respect to different job- and firm-based 
characteristics are presented in Figure 2. First there is a slight inversely u-shaped curve 
for tenure in 1989. In later years, this picture disappears and the training rates are nearly 
stable over all tenure groups (Figure 2a). A limited work contract seems to have no clear 
link with participation in further training. At most, lower training rates for individuals 
with a limited work contract can be observed in the year 2008 (Figure 2b). Figures 2c 
and 2d show training rates for different groups of blue-collar and white-collar workers. 
Training rates increase in the job responsibility. It is also evident that white-collar 
worker have on average higher training rates than blue-collar workers. When looking at 
different firm size categories (Figure 2e), no considerable differences in training rates 
between the smallest size (<20 employees) and the second smallest group (20-199 
employees) can be shown. However, people in bigger firms have higher rates. Another 
interesting point is that the development over time suggests a convergence of training 
rates across firm size categories. Last, full-time employees report considerably more 
often participation in training than individuals in part-time employment relationships 
(see Figure 2f). Figure 2: Participation rates in further training over time (job- and firm-based 
characteristics) 
Note: The results are calculated with cross-sectional weights. To sum up, most of these illustrations are in line with the hypotheses derived above in 
section 2. However, the results of these bivariate illustrations cannot be interpreted as 
effects. We therefore proceed with a multivariate analysis to test our hypotheses. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Our dependent variable is the dummy variable “Further Training” (as explained in 
chapter 3). We start with presenting our results gained from the random effects probit 
model. 
Most of our hypotheses are supported by the results of the binary probit estimate (see 
Table 3): Participation in further training is significantly lower for females, foreigners 
and West Germans over the whole observation period on average. We also find an 
inversely u-shaped effect for age with a maximum at 27 years. As predicted, the 
probability of being trained increases in the level of the job responsibility. White-collar 
workers denote on average more training than blue-collar workers. Schooling is 
positively associated with the probability of training. As expected, there is a u-shaped 
effect of tenure on further training (minimum at 15 years).
4 Furthermore, we find a 
positive effect for the actual working hours per week and a negative effect for a limited 
work contract. Employees in bigger firms face a higher training probability. There is no 
significant difference between the lowest and the second-lowest firm size category, 
though. Our hypothesis with respect to the general trend over time is mainly supported. 
Training probability has increased significantly from 1989 to 2000 and from 2000 to 
2008. However, there is no significant increase from 1993 to 2000 and again from 2000 
to 2004. A joint test for the set of year dummies reveals a high significance, though. 
                                                 
4 However, this effect is not very big and not independent from the effect of age since increasing tenure 
of an individual goes automatically along with an increasing age. A joint consideration of both tenure 
and age reveals a constantly negative influence on training participation, which means that the age effect 
overcompensate the effect of tenure in higher years. Table 3: Determinants of further training (random effects binary probit estimate, 
pooled) 
  Random effects binary probit 
Participation in training (1=yes) 
Marginal effects 
 
Age  0.038*** (0.012)  0.007 
Age² x 100  -0.070*** (0.014)  -0.012 
Female  -0.151*** (0.040)  -0.026 
Foreigner  -0.487*** (0.064)  -0.069 
Residence in East Germany  0.127*** (0.039)  0.023 
Job status    
Untrained blue-collar worker  -1.325*** (0.163)  -0.105 
Semi-trained blue-collar worker  -0.948*** (0.082)  -0.111 
Trained blue-collar worker  -0.462*** (0.067)  -0.069 
Foreman, team leader  ---  --- 
White-collar worker with simple tasks  -0.202*** (0.078)  -0.032 
Qualified professional  0.167** (0.068)  0.031 
Highly qualified professional or managerial position  0.338*** (0.072)  0.068 
Years of schooling  0.043*** (0.008)  0.008 
Tenure (in years)  -0.014*** (0.005)  -0.003 
Tenure² x 100  0.046*** (0.015)  0.008 
Actual work time per week  0.007*** (0.002)  0.001 
limited work contract  -0.169** (0.081)  -0.027 
Firm size    
Up to 19 employees  -0.024 (0.042)  -0.004 
20-199 employees  ---  --- 
200-1999 employees  0.217*** (0.042)  0.041 
At least 2000 employees  0.404*** (0.042)  0.082 
Industry    
Agriculture  -0.019 (0.104)  -0.003 
Manufacturing ---  --- 
Construction  -0.201*** (0.062)  -0.032 
Retail/Tourism/Transportation  -0.069 (0.043)  -0.012 
Financial/Corporate Services  0.150*** (0.050)  0.028 
Public and Private Services  0.370*** (0.052)  0.078 
Year    
1989  -0.121** (0.054)  -0.020 
1993  0.024 (0.045)  0.004 
2000 ---  --- 
2004  0.001 (0.041)  0.000 
2008  0.146*** (0.042)  0.027 
Intercept  -2.153*** (0.267)   
Observations (persons)  18,375 (10,363)   
McFadden Pseudo-R²   0.12  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of other independent 
variables. Looking at marginal effects, we find the most pronounced relations to training 
participation for being a foreigner, job status and firm size. Training participation rates 
are seven percentage points lower for foreigners than for Germans, 17 points larger for 
highly qualified white-collars than for unskilled blue-collar workers and nine points 
higher in large firms with at least 2,000 employees than in small firms with less than 20 
employees. 
Our descriptive illustrations give some indications that there are differences with respect 
to training rates for different subgroups between the single years. Therefore, we also 
present the results of binary probit regressions on the base of single years´ data sets (see 
Table 4). A significant inversely u-shaped correlation between age and training is only 
observable in 2004 (maximum at 33 years). Women denote significant lower training 
rates than men only in 2004. There is a significant lower probability of being trained for 
foreigners in 1993, 2000 and 2004. However, the coefficients become smaller over time, 
which indicates a decreasing importance of being a foreigner for training participation. 
As predicted, East Germans have a significant higher training rate directly after the 
German re-unification. 
There is a clear link between the level of job responsibility and training probability in 
all five years. Furthermore, white-collar workers denote continuously higher rates than 
blue-collar workers. Years of schooling are positively correlated with training from 
1993 on. We get the predicted u-shaped relation between tenure and training probability 
only in 2004 (with a minimum of 17 years). Working time and training show a 
significant link in 1989, 2004 and 2008. Only in the year 2008, employees with a 
limited work contract denote a lower training probability. The evidence for firm size is 
not as clear as in our random effects estimation, as we get continuously significant coefficients only for the biggest firm size. However, when looking on the sign of the 
other coefficients, we can see the predicted positive link between firm size and training. 
The goodness of fit, measured by the Pseudo-R
2, decreases over time. Therefore, other 
(unobserved) determinants become more important. 
Table 4: Determinants of further training (binary probit estimates; single years) 
  Binary probit (1=yes) 
              (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
    1989  (West)  1993 2000 2004 2008 
Age  -0.022 (0.032)  0.039 (0.028)  0.008 (0.028) 0.068***  (0.025) 0.027  (0.025) 
Age² x 100  -0.0024 (0.041)  -0.072** (0.035)  -0.036 (0.034) -0.102***  (0.030) -0.044  (0.030) 
Female  -0.132 (0.111)  -0.126 (0.090)  0.043 (0.093) -0.304***  (0.079) -0.036  (0.080) 
Foreigner  -0.153 (0.179)  -0.667*** (0.150) -0.394**  (0.164) -0.329** (0.132)  -0.222 (0.159) 
Residence in East Germany   0.283***  (0.077)  0.125  (0.088)  0.175** (0.079)  -0.057 (0.081) 
Job status       
Untrained blue-collar worker  -1.730*** (0.370)  -1.271*** (0.395) -1.014***  (0.319) -0.788*** (0.286)  -1.724*** (0.387) 
Semi-trained blue-collar 
worker  -1.025*** (0.231)  -0.666*** (0.163) -0.937***  (0.191) -0.758*** (0.196)  -0.778*** (0.194) 
Trained blue-collar worker  -0.348** (0.174)  -0.325** (0.136) -0.685***  (0.160) -0.379*** (0.142)  -0.413*** (0.152) 
Foreman,  team  leader  --- --- --- --- --- 
White-collar worker with 
simple tasks  -0.267 (0.221)  -0.152 (0.169)  -0.473** (0.198)  -0.110 (0.164)  -0.217 (0.174) 
Qualified professional  0.299* (0.175)  0.111 (0.142)  -0.122 (0.162)  0.132 (0.140)  0.061 (0.155) 
Highly qualified professional 
or managerial position  0.519*** (0.189)  0.240 (0.150)  -0.034 (0.176)  0.261* (0.151)  0.233 (0.167) 
Years of schooling  0.027 (0.021)  0.058*** (0.019)  0.046** (0.019) 0.042**  (0.017) 0.049***  (0.017) 
Tenure (in years)  0.007 (0.015)  0.003 (0.011)  0.003 (0.012) -0.019*  (0.010) 0.009  (0.011) 
Tenure² x 100  0.023 (0.042)  0.0046 (0.035)  -0.0058 (0.034)  0.056* (0.030)  -0.019 (0.031) 
Actual working time per week  0.007* (0.004)  0.008* (0.005)  0.004 (0.004) 0.005  (0.003)  0.012***  (0.004) 
limited work contract  -0.233 (0.245)  0.219 (0.216)  -0.287 (0.190)  -0.220 (0.158)  -0.490** (0.198) 
Firm size       
Up to 19 employees  0.047 (0.122)  -0.012 (0.104)  -0.062 (0.099)  0.125 (0.085)  0.023 (0.091) 
20-199  employees  --- --- --- --- --- 
200-1999 employees  0.171 (0.115)  0.169* (0.092)  0.093 (0.108)  0.193** (0.091)  0.147 (0.092) 
At least 2000 employees  0.325*** (0.113)  0.533*** (0.094)  0.328*** (0.100) 0.429***  (0.089) 0.248***  (0.088) 
Industry       
Agriculture  -0.629 (0.504)  -0.306* (0.158)  0.179 (0.235) -0.355*  (0.194) -0.066  (0.283) 
Manufacturing  --- --- --- --- --- 
Construction  -0.097 (0.168)  -0.251** (0.109)  -0.351** (0.174)  -0.249** (0.117)  -0.153 (0.131) 
Retail/Tourism/Transportation  0.173 (0.122)  0.000 (0.099)  -0.079 (0.104)  -0.117 (0.092)  -0.058 (0.094) 
Financial/Corporate Services  0.327** (0.129)  0.291** (0.117)  0.181 (0.119)  0.222** (0.101)  0.065 (0.102) 
Public and Private Services  0.250 (0.172)  0.083 (0.141)  0.143 (0.124)  0.333*** (0.097)  0.383*** (0.107) 
Intercept  -0.896 (0.684)  -2.424*** (0.618) -1.072*  (0.637) -2.460*** (0.592)  -2.170*** (0.573) 
Observations  2,502 3,693 3,332 4,491 4,356 
McFadden Pseudo-R²   0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.13 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results are calculated with cross-sectional weights. 
 Challenging our results, one may argue that we concentrate on training participation and 
abstain from analyzing any kind of training quality or intensity. For this purpose, 
possible indicators could be the length of the course or the productivity gain due to 
further training. Some studies like Pischke (2001) or Georgellis and Lange (2007) try to 
estimate some kind of training intensity by regressing the overall individual duration of 
training courses on possible determinants (measured in days respectively weeks). 
However, the explanatory power of these estimations is very low. This could arise from 
data restrictions as the GSOEP does not provide detailed information if the course was 
full-time or only some hours per day or week. Furthermore, information about the 
duration is only available for the last three courses. Nevertheless, we also estimated 
ordered probit models with a comparable specification using the number of courses 
within the one year period as the dependent variable. The qualitative results are similar 
to our binary probit estimates. 
An important strand of literature focuses on the distinction between general and firm-
specific human capital (see already Becker 1962). According to human capital theory, 
firms should not invest in general skills of employees as they are completely 
transferable to other firms and, hence, the training firm has little possibilities to save the 
earnings of the investment. However, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) argue that the 
training firm has superior information with respect to the impact of the training course 
and the abilities of the employee. Hence, the firm has some kind of monopsony power 
against the worker. In consequence, the employer can amortize the costs of further 
training, even if it provides general knowledge and abilities. Indeed, there is some 
evidence by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) or Büchel and Pannenberg (2004) that 
German firms companies bear at least part of the costs in most cases. Lazear (2009) 
argues that all skills are general, but a vector of certain general skills is used in different combinations and with different weights across companies. Therefore, most human 
capital investments within firms do have a specific character and, hence, also employers 
have incentives to invest in some mix if general human capital components of their 
employees. 
As the GSOEP provides us with some information about the specificity of the training 
course (at least for one course in the years 1993 until 2008), we are able to estimate a 
multinomial probit model with a three-digit dependent variable with the categories “no 
training” (base), “rather firm specific training” and “rather general training”. Results are 
shown in Appendix 1 and reveal similar relations for both kinds of training. Since the 
characteristics hardly differ, we are convinced that a further distinction between general 
and firm specific human capital investments is not beneficial for this contribution.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Based on theoretical considerations, we investigate possible characteristics of 
participation in further training. We observe a period of twenty years from 1989 to 
2008, using representative employee data from Germany. Our longitudinal analysis of 
the whole observation period provided support for most of our hypotheses. Looking on 
economic relevance, we find that being a foreigner, the job status and the firm size 
affects the training decisions most. The analyses of five single years´ cross-sectional 
data from within the 20 year period reveal that these results are rather stable over time. 
Furthermore, we detect a general trend of an increasing training participation. 
To check for the robustness of our results, we also differentiate between investments in 
general and specific human capital. It reveals that the determinants of those two kinds of 
investments are rather similar. Thus, the distinction between these two kinds of human capital seems to be of minor importance for the decision on further training 
participation. 
We find a shrinking goodness of fit of our model with respect to the determinants of 
training over time, which seems to indicate that other factors become more important. 
Further research should investigate which other determinants (that are not included in 
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184. Appendix 1: Determinants of firm-specific and general further training 
(multinomial probit estimate, pooled) 
  
Multinomial probit (base= no training) 
 
   firm-specific  general 
Age  0.038** (0.019)  0.053*** (0.015) 
Age² x 100  -0.065*** (0.023)  -0.091*** (0.019) 
Female  -0.314*** (0.058)  -0.068 (0.049) 
Foreigner  -0.469*** (0.100)  -0.525*** (0.086) 
Residence in East Germany  0.184*** (0.054)  0.092** (0.046) 
Job status    
Untrained blue-collar worker  -1.049*** (0.257)  -1.645*** (0.243) 
Semi-trained blue-collar worker  -0.716*** (0.125)  -1.257*** (0.110) 
Trained blue-collar worker  -0.306*** (0.104)  -0.597*** (0.085) 
Foreman, team leader  --- --- 
White-collar worker with simple tasks  -0.066 (0.121)  -0.394*** (0.100) 
Qualified professional  0.218** (0.105)  0.105 (0.086) 
Highly qualified professional or managerial position  0.235** (0.111)  0.353*** (0.090) 
Years of schooling  0.037*** (0.012)  0.042*** (0.010) 
Tenure (in years)  -0.008 (0.008)  -0.055*** (0.020) 
Tenure² x 100  0.037 (0.023)  0.001*** (0.000) 
Actual work time per week  0.003 (0.003)  0.011*** (0.002) 
limited work contract  -0.274** (0.136)  -0.134 (0.107) 
Firm size    
Up to 19 employees  -0.024 (0.067)  0.025 (0.053) 
20-199 employees  --- --- 
200-1999 employees  0.352*** (0.065)  0.189*** (0.054) 
At least 2000 employees  0.693*** (0.063)  0.413*** (0.053) 
Industry    
Agriculture  0.330** (0.134)  -0.187 (0.137) 
Manufacturing  --- --- 
Construction  -0.228** (0.100)  -0.191** (0.078) 
Retail/Tourism/Transportation  -0.020 (0.064)  -0.130** (0.054) 
Financial/Corporate Services  0.138* (0.073)  0.181*** (0.060) 
Public and Private Services  0.419*** (0.077)  0.413*** (0.064) 
Year    
1993  -0.157** (0.073)  -0.028 (0.059) 
2000  --- --- 
2004  0.054 (0.064)  -0.024 (0.054) 
2008  0.182*** (0.064)  0.144*** (0.054) 
Intercept  -3.105*** (0.420)  -2.867*** (0.349) 
Observations  15,777 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 